This article summarises a doctoral dissertation at the Faculty of Law at the University of Hamburg, Germany. The thesis has been published 2015 as part of a publication series of the Hans-Bredow-Institut, Hamburg, with NOMOS Publishing House, Baden-Baden. The dissertation herein summarised provides a concrete legal substantiation of an accountability of the State to enact a regulatory framework which ensures vendor-independent data formats in the private market (below chapter VI-VII). As a result, this work offers the necessary objective, perspective, regulatory means and the avoidance of complex evidential problems to legally ensure interoperability in the market of telematics. In order to derive these results the economic, social and technical background as well as the actual existing influence possibilities of the State must be outlined first (chapter I-V). Although the findings summarised here are primarily derived from German law, they are likely to be applicable to other European legislations as well due to the fact that German telecommunication law is considerably superimposed by European telecommunication law.
In contrast to previously commonly used direct analog fixation and transmission, modern digital technology is distinguished by an abstract and indirect encoding / transmission of information, by the way of interpreting two signal statuses 8 . When using digital technology, any messages (for example graphic characters, speech or pictures) are recorded in an analog form only as a first step. Subsequently the message must be binary-encoded, thus fragmented into two signal states according to defined abstract principles 9 . The circuits that computer technology depend on are only able to provide two signal states -electricity on and off (0 and 1) 10 . The complex rules and principles which are necessary for such an abstract encoding of information are defined by the data format used. Like compiled software code, such data formats are abstract artificial languages that must be specified by completely formal grammar and cannot be defined by their usage or context 11 .
In the course of information transfer, standards of digital message encoding hold a key position. Subsequent to the necessary step of digital encoding, only those recipients will have access to digitalised information who are actually able to implement the used data format. If communication is realised by maximum integration of vendor specific encoding of information, the information flow is consequently limited to vendor specific software. Whoever controls the technology in which information is encoded, controls the access to communication and is able to determine the modalities for utilisation 12 . This particularly applies to aspects of transparency and security, which has lately been demonstrated in the context of the revelations of Edward Snowden regarding NSA.
When a technical specification exclusively offered by a single supplier has penetrated the market without any interoperable implementations on offer from a competitor, it is misleadingly spoken of as a 'proprietary standard'
13
. The establishment of a proprietary standard presupposes that the principles of a data format are kept secret and/or are protected as intangible property, and hence are not, or not completely, available to competitors and society. Strictly speaking, such proprietary standards are no standards at all, at least not in the proper sense of the word, but rather the de-facto usual that is vendor specific 14 .
Examples of lacking compatibility in the course of digital information encoding are numerous and diverse. For instance, during the catastrophic flood in Southeast Asia in 2004 it was not possible to exchange documents necessary for rescue and identification of victims among governmental agencies due to vendor specific document formats 15 . The vendor specific encoding of FEMA aid online, the official governmental website for coordination of disaster relief in the USA, prevented some victims of Hurricane Katrina from registering; at first only victims using Microsoft Internet Explorer where able to sign up for governmental assistance and support 16 . Also the Live-Stream of the European Parliament available on the Internet had until recently been encoded in a vendor-specific manner and only individuals using the Windows Media Player were able to view the stream 17 .
In order to allow communication, a technical process must be organised and unified. Unlike a nongrid-bound energy supply with mineral oil and coal, the communication infrastructure is a synchronised and cooperative machine 18 . Thus, for decades the telephone system was called the "biggest machine of the world"
19
. What makes a network system into a consistent machine is the successful cooperation of its individual parts. Within the modern and privatised telecommunication market, the necessary technical standardisation does not only determine the communication channels between the individual users but it also determines whether or not competitors might have effective opportunities of accessing the market.
Nowadays, digital telecommunication not only creates the prerequisite for changed economic structures, but also for modern political systems 20 . The convergent process of digital transmission of information constitutes a key element of democratic, social and economic processes and thus is of considerable importance. Convergent transmission of digital information, its services and applications have an impact on every aspect of our lives: our home, our workplace, our access to healthcare, the economy, public services and different forms of participation in a democratic society 21 .
Such a key function already made the telegraph network, and later the telephone network, into evident and undeniable objects of State interest. The same applies to the modern, digital and convergent system of telecommunication. Consequently, governments and political leaders bear a special responsibility for this fundamental infrastructure 22 . The values underlying this responsibility of the State are reflected in the German constitution 23 , are to be found in several aspects of European Community law and are globally recognised as well 24 . In accordance with provisions of European law, the German federal legislator in article 87f GG (German constitution) has a statutory duty to regulate the telecommunication sector 25 . Besides that, article 5 GG 26 already sets out the Federal Republic of Germany as being a free information society. Same basic principles apply in EU law and in other member states as well 27 . Free information flow must be open for participation, thereby ensuring that nobody is excluded from the outset 28 .
analyses have been conducted and the present topic has not been analysed in the necessary overall context. Accordingly, quite different approaches have been discussed. Where vendor-specific technologies have already been established in the market in general, the applied means to solve such interoperability problems have failed so far due to a limited perspective, the lack of regulatory procedures and ultimately the prevailing market reality.
In the course of current statutory provisions and underlying conceptual ideas that have been adapted to cover mono-functional and analog technical capabilities, the changed technical processes and potentials of digital transmission of information lead to difficulties of application and interpretation of law. Inconsistencies and significant need for clarification arise especially in relation to telecommunication, media, intellectual property and competition law, as well as the so called egovernment.
II. The Relevance of Technical Standards
It is of utmost importance to understand the role of technical standards in the process of digital telecommunication 30 . Technical standards do not constitute legal rules. Usually they are compiled by non-governmental private associations or individual commercial enterprises that are neither institutionally integrated as public administration nor act as public authority. It is only in particular cases that legal rules make reference to individual technical standards so that a legal binding effect is generated. However, within the framework of transmission of digital messages, market realities and technical dependencies constitute de facto binding effects which are quite comparable to legal norms.
Complex network effects and a very effective vendor lock-in lead to a situation where only one specification for encoding of information can prevail irrespective of whether it is a vendor-specific or a vendor-neutral standard. But the degree of vendor independence / openness of the prevailing standard determines how vendor-independent, open and functional the process of digital communication is organised and whether reliable long-term archiving is possible.
Only joint and vendor-independent standards are able to provide effective possibilities of market access and bear sufficient assurance that long-term archiving will be achievable 31 . In contrast, under an established vendor-specific standard, competition is prevented 32 , telecommunication capabilities are bound to an individual vendor 33 , future presentation of archived information is endangered 34 and the effect of convergence is limited to the field in which the vendor who owns the proprietary standard is developing solutions 35 . Joint technical standards can therefore be desirable or threatening, depending on whose interests are being pursued 36 .
Common vendor-independent standards may be formal standards, de jure standards or de facto standards. Only such joint standards at the level of encoding of digital messages will enable competition within an interconnected telecommunication market 37 . This applies on the one hand to competition in the software market, which depends on a particular standard technology, and on the 30 other hand to competition among different standard technologies, which only by their interchangeability can compete on the basis of quality and not distribution.
In contrast, vendor-specific data formats put through by a market leader or monopolist are incompatible with software solutions of other vendors. Such proprietary standards hold their ground in the market quite independently of the software and the data format quality because only the combination between market-leading proprietary software and market-dominating vendor-specific data format enables information processing and communication. 
III. Inconsistencies of Current Telecommunication Regulation
Pursuant to European legal guidelines, the purpose of German telecommunication law is to enable effective market access opportunities in all areas of telecommunication and, additionally, to implement concrete political objectives related to public welfare into the privatised telecommunication market. Classical methods to achieve these goals are product-related regulatory instruments, such as technical standardisation.
Despite the fact that data formats are a mandatory part of any transmission of digital information, this aspect is currently largely ignored in telecommunication regulation as well as in jurisprudential discussion 39 . Whilst German telecommunication law has established a close supervision and regulation of technical standardisation between network-and-terminal-devices, as well as between network-and-network, the interoperability of terminal devices among each other (in particular the encoding of the information contained in the transmitted binary code) plays no more than a very subordinate role 40 .
In large part this is due to the fact that the focus of attention traditionally lies on classical fixednetwork voice telephony (by now digitalised) which presently requires no regulation at all. In this area there is currently no risk of monopolising the principles for the encoding of messages. The process of digital encoding, which is so central for the interoperability of terminal devices, is conducted in accordance with principles of a vendor-independent and royalty-free standard published 37 In some other areas of modern telecommunication, technical standards for encoding of information that currently indisputably deserve the title 'open standard' have prevailed. For example, HTML for webpages and certain versions of the PDF standard for non-editable electronic documents. These market results are in accordance with the concept which has been the basis of privatisation of former state-owned telecommunication monopolies 42 .
At present, data formats are regulated as part of the telecommunication infrastructure only in the exceptional case of digital television sets with a 'classic' shape that offer the respective reception of 'classic' television. When vendor specific encoding of information threatened to monopolise the market, governmental regulation introduced joint and vendor-independent standards for data formats, cryptographic methods and even programming interfaces (API) into the private market before monopolisation could take place, i.e. vendor specific standards could be established 43 . The respective regulatory regime is required by European guidelines 44 and implemented by German telecommunication law in paragraphs 48 et seq. TKG (German Telecommunications Act).
For all other modern forms of communication, only the transmission of abstract binary code from network termination point to network termination point is ensured by regulatory means. This applies even though vendor specific technologies have for decades successfully penetrated the terminal device software market. Governmental regulatory means in place only assure that any user may connect any terminal device to electronic communication networks. However, the fact that the reproduction of information content is only possible when a specific software solution is used is not at all addressed.
It would therefore appear that outside of the transmission of 'classic' television by means of 'conventional' networks, major barriers to interoperability have been established for decades without telecommunication regulation having been taken into account at all. As far as communication is facilitated by maximum integration of vendor-specific technologies, interoperable communication and hence competition is excluded in the affected market sector. Due to network effects and vendor lock-in, consumers will be bound to the adapted vendor-specific technology 45 . Accordingly, the main objective of telecommunication regulation in respect of terminal equipment remains unfulfilled, namely to enable consumers to use the terminal device of her/his choice for communication 46 .
This differentiation between telecommunication for the purpose of transmission of 'classic' television by means of 'conventional', but now digitised, television networks using terminal devices referred to as 'television sets' versus any other forms of modern telecommunication cannot be justified either technically or from a legal standpoint. There are no convincing arguments why only devices sold under the denomination 'digital television sets' and no other shape factors which are equally able to receive 'classic' television by means of 'conventional' networks should be covered by the regulatory regime of paragraphs 48 et. seq. TKG and the respective European guidelines 47 . Furthermore, there is no objective reason why other devices which receive 'classic' television via the Internet (IP-TV) are not treated as 'digital television sets' as well 48 . Just as it remains unclear why digital transmission of documents via public communication networks does not need to be protected against monopolisation. These differentiations can only be explained with outdated mental models which are suited to analog, mono-functional and technically separated means of communication and cannot be perpetuated in the age of convergence 49 .
These general consequences of convergence need to be separated from the question, what regulatory density may be necessary in an individual case. In this respect, differentiations might be required and appropriate. After all, the convergent telecommunication services have quite different characteristics and effects 50 .
IV. Limitations of Competition Law
In view of the outlined current lack of legal telecommunication regulation in respect of existing barriers to interoperability, the question arises which control options are offered by competition law. After all, a proprietary standard 51 is equivalent to a barrier to entry for other competitors. This applies both to the software markets depending on the standard technology, as well as to the competition for the best standard technology.
However, only under very particular circumstances, proprietary standards may lead to consequences of competition law in an individual case ex post 52 . Only in the event that certain facts are to be proven and under a high degree of discretion, certain case groups may lead to an individual retrospective revision of particular market results. This is, however, of very limited practical value in a highly dynamic market of telematics 53 .
It is a fact that a proprietary standard always means a barrier to entry for other competitors within a market sector, which has been monopolised by that particular proprietary technology. But it follows from the dynamic principles of competition, which have been applied as a basis for the competition law in force, that dominant positions, or even monopolies by themselves, cannot be restricted by control options of competition law. Hence, taken in isolation, a dominant position or even a 47 54 . Rather, from this viewpoint, the tendencies towards monopoly in the telematics sector associated with network effects, by themselves, must be seen as a process which cannot be intervened by competition law 55 . Especially in markets in which network effects are highly effective and only one technical standard may survive, an embittered struggle for the greatest possible market share is part of functioning competition for the market and does not lead per se to competition law concerns 56 . Considered by itself from the point of view of competition law, it is irrelevant whether a proprietary standard, de facto standard, formal standard or even an open standard prevails.
V. Overstrained E-government
Today, the issue of lacking common technical standards for digital encoding of messages and the question which requirements should be fulfilled by such common standards, are primarily discussed in connection with e-government initiatives. After all, e-government as a future model is subject to the prerequisite of an interoperable telecommunication infrastructure. In particular, without open standards for the digital encoding of messages, central challenges of e-government remain unresolvable 57 .
However, only the omission of regulation by telecommunication law has led to the current situation that interoperability of data formats is primarily discussed as a prerequisite of a functioning egovernment. Instead, in connection with the regulation of the technical telecommunication infrastructure, solution approaches are currently being discussed in the context of the type of content that is being transported by the telecommunication infrastructure. This leads to serious problems because a general vendor dependence in the telecommunication infrastructure cannot be efficiently solved by specifying technical standards for individual governmental services.
Information campaigns and political decisions on principles, both internationally and in Germany, advocate the use of open standards in e-government. Primarily this is substantiated by the factual positive effects caused by the use of vendor-independent standards. However, it has not been successful to derive this requirement from concrete legal grounds; instead the respective reasoning confines itself to a mere reference to the principle of democracy and freedom of speech 58 . In accordance with the current legal situation, the primary aim of a particular e-government service remains to reach as many communication partners as possible and to enable respective up-and downstream data processing 59 .
Moreover, e-government as a communication service can only have an indirect impact on the privatised market by selective procurement 60 . If, however, a software has established itself in the market, and this software exclusively supports vendor specific encoding error-free, only a fraction of the population may be reached by solutions from other software providers -even if these solutions use data formats which are indeed vendor independent and hence interoperable. Ultimately, a market leader, who has successfully established a proprietary standard, has no interest in implementing a vendor-independent standard in a fully interoperable manner 61 . Therefore, a significant influence on the market will probably not be exerted. Under such conditions an exclusive use of open standards may in fact lead to failure or at least to a reduced acceptance of the e-government service in question.
Nevertheless, there are several pilot projects and concrete decisions of the German administration, which use and advocate open standards despite established vendor-specific technologies 62 . Internationally there are also numerous migration attempts. However, governmental agencies are caught in a predicament: on the one hand open standards are essential prerequisites for e-government services and moreover are socially desirable. On the other hand the main goal of an e-government service is to reach as many citizens as possible 63 . As a result of this problematic situation, where there is a market dominating proprietary standard, as a general rule, governmental authorities exclusively support the proprietary standard and, at best, implement a dual solution, thereby supporting the use of the proprietary standard and, as an alternative, an open standard that has not been established in the market. But there are substantial concerns about the practicality and the prospect of success of such a dual strategy 64 . Another approach is simply attempting to avoid monopolised channels of telecommunication and thus circumventing the problem of vendor lock-in instead of solving it.
Ultimately, in contrast to the various stated intentions and decisions of principle in which open standards are demanded, concrete technical e-government services currently rather depend on vendor-specific proprietary standards established in the market. Instead of opposing private monopolisations, the State submits to an existing market failure.
VI. The Constitutional Obligation for Open Standards
Given the current limitation of telecommunication law regulation, the limited perspective of competition law and the powerlessness of e-government initiatives, the further conclusions of the dissertation herein summarised are becoming highly relevant. Under a thorough analysis, it becomes apparent that an accountability of the federal legislator for open standards regarding digital encoding of information is an inevitable consequence of governmental obligations with respect to the telecommunication infrastructure stipulated in article 87f GG (German constitution) 65 . This accountability necessarily refers to the entire telecommunication market, including any innovations and modern technologies 66 .
Proprietary standards on the level of encoding of information deprive the privatisation of the telecommunication sector of justification. Only if effective opportunities of market access actually exist, it may be expected that the intended increase of efficiency and the allocation effects optimising the common good can take effect 67 . Therefore, the federal legislator is being obligated in article 87f Abs. 2 S. 1 GG to continuously guarantee effective opportunities of market access, in order to enable the envisaged effects of the private market. In the area of telematics, interoperability and opportunities of market access are synonymous with vendor independent standards 68 . In contrast, the establishment of a proprietary standard is synonymous with a structural barrier to entry which prevents competition.
Private economic competition in the telecommunications sector has been permitted only under the condition that effective opportunities of market access are created, as well as maintained, and competitors remain bound to a special social responsibility 69 . After implementation of a vendorspecific proprietary standard, it is not to be expected that such a monopolised private market sector will be better suited than a single state-owned public enterprise to enable the potential for innovation of digital technology. In consequence of an established proprietary standard, and hence under absence of competition, it is left to the sole discretion of the private monopolist how and to what extent the former state-run service of general interest is fulfilled. In contrast to a state-owned monopolist, a private monopolist is not bound by administrative guidelines, fundamental rights of the population, national objectives, let alone the common good. Therefore, in such a market situation, it must be assumed that the privatised market is even less efficient for determining and fulfilling the common good than the state-owned monopoly ever was.
The concept of privatisation does not primarily call for individual standards developed or stipulated by the government as far as a market failure is ascertained. Telecommunication regulations must take into account that the affected markets are to a high degree dependent on technical aspects affected by enormous, barely assessable developments 70 . In consequence, the federal legislator primarily needs to establish relevant mandatory requirements in the context of which private competitors may develop individual technical standards and solutions. Structural barriers to competition must be dissolved but market results should not be anticipated. In contrast to such regulation of market structure, egovernment services must elect particular technologies. This leads to major difficulties where a solution that does not dominate the market is chosen.
In the regulatory environment of digital television (paragraphs 48 et seq. TKG and the respective European legal guidelines), all competitors regardless of a dominating position are committed to implement technical standards in compliance with certain minimum requirements 71 . Thus, the government provides a legal framework which ensures effective opportunities of market access and moreover implements the ideas of state welfare that have been democratically determined. Within this regulated market structure, private subjects define the technical details by standardisation of individual specifications. However, it should be clarified that the governmental responsibility for open standards does not necessarily preclude vendor specific and exclusive technologies. Rather, individual companies might very well continue to implement their more or less vendor-specific technologies but, besides these, they must also implement an open standard completely and operationally.
The globalisation of the information technology sector does not make an European or national process of standardisation superfluous. The slow adjustment of international structures to changed power relations in the telecommunication sector in fact leads to an increasing importance of regional standardisation 72 . However, the consequence of international dimension is that worldwide processes of development and global interests must be taken into account 73 .
In the future, it will become more and more relevant that the governmental responsibility for vendorindependent standards not only refers to communication between person and person as well as person and machine, but also increasingly to communication between machine and machine.
VII. Consequences
The German federal legislator is therefore obligated under article 87f GG to provide a regulatory framework which ensures vendor-independent data formats in the privatised market. To fulfil this accountability and thereby solve the problem of lacking interoperability, it is advisable to choose regulatory means provided by sector-specific and hence the most appropriate telecommunication law 74 . After all, this area of law has the objective to fulfil the governmental responsibility regarding the telecommunication sector in a privatised market. Therefore, adjusted regulatory instruments are provided to enable competition in a complex network economy and moreover to achieve certain politically intended public interests. Telecommunication law offers the necessary objective, perspective, regulatory means and the avoidance of complex evidential problems to ensure interoperability in the market of telematics.
The federal legislator within its margin of discretion may choose other means to fulfil its accountability instead of enacting telecommunication law. For example, it may choose to adapt the regulations of competition law and/or certain e-government initiatives 75 . The exact manner in which the legislator fulfils its constitutional mandate is largely left to its discretion. However, the measures taken and laws enacted must neither be counterproductive nor absolutely inadequate to achieve the protection objectives 76 . In particular, the federal legislator cannot continue to simply ignore its constitutional obligation, as it has been doing so far.
From the particular perspective of the constitutional obligation regarding the telecommunication sector, a special situation arises in respect of the general need for standardisation. In general, it is not the objective of technical standardisation to fulfil governmental accountability or necessarily to enable effective opportunities of market access, but it is rather about the sole technical, economical or even the more restricted point of view of competition law 77 . In the course of the constitutional accountability for the telecommunication sector, effective opportunities of market access must be enabled and particular interests of public welfare -which are to be defined in a democratic processneed to be ensured. . However, it may be reasonably arguable that in general (F)RAND terms are in compliance with the ex-post evaluation of competition law 79 . From the special perspective of constitutional accountability for open standards it becomes obvious that (F)RAND terms are not suitable to provide the necessary ex-ante market structure regulation 80 . The minimum requirement of a (F)RAND license is neither able to guarantee certain public interests nor effective opportunities of market access for competitors. In particular, it needs to be taken into account that Free Software 81 is excluded from implementing (F)RAND licensed standards due to the recurring licence fees per utilisation and area of application 82 .
Following a thorough analysis, the constitutional accountability for open standards in article 87f GG requires at least a royalty-free form of licensing. Although, under a royalty-free license 83 it remains undetermined as well, which particular licence conditions may be demanded in an individual case. Royalty-free does not mean that the licensing is free of charge or additional restrictions. But in contrast to (F)RAND terms, the clear exclusion of recurring royalties leads to a higher degree of legal certainty regarding the future potential for implementing a common standard. This thereby considerably reduces the legal uncertainty which arises in connection with the legality of individual license conditions 84 . Thus, for instance, under a royalty-free license, implementations of the specification and, therefore, opportunities of market access are permitted regardless of the individual software license or business model 85 . Under a respective political decision, there are good reasons to go even farther and demand licence terms comparable with Free Software licences for open standards 86 .
However, as long as the accountability for market structure regulation in favour of vendor independent standards is not recognised, all future visions of the digital age are threatened to fail. Without the implementation of open standards, no interoperable information transmission and, therefore, in particular, no e-government, no paperless office and no electronic legal transaction will be feasible to the extent that has been promised for decades with tiresome regularity. 
